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A B S T R A C T   
In addiction, apparently causally significant phenomena occur at a huge number of levels; addiction is affected 
by biomedical, neurological, pharmacological, clinical, social, and politico-legal factors, among many others. In 
such a complex, multifaceted field of inquiry, it seems very unlikely that all the many layers of explanation will 
prove amenable to any simple or straightforward, reductive analysis; if we are to unify the many different sci-
ences of addiction while respecting their causal autonomy, then, what we are likely to need is an integrative 
framework. In this paper, we propose the theory of “Externalist” or “4E” – for extended, embodied, embedded, 
and enactive – cognition, which focuses on the empirical and conceptual centrality of the wider extra-neural 
environment to cognitive and mental processes, as a candidate for such a framework. We begin in Section 2 
by outlining how such a perspective might apply to psychiatry more generally, before turning to some of the 
ways it can illuminate addiction in particular: Section 3 points to a way of dissolving the classic dichotomy 
between the “choice model” and “disease model” in the addiction literature; Section 4 shows how 4E concepts 
can clarify the interplay between the addict’s brain and her environment; and Section 5 considers how these 
insights help to explain the success of some recovery strategies, and may help to inform the development of new 
ones.   
1. Introduction 
One of the most perplexing features of addiction, from an academic 
point of view, is the sheer number of levels at which apparently causally 
significant phenomena occur. As a subject, it seems to be simultaneously 
affected by biomedical, neurological, pharmacological, clinical, social, 
and politico-legal factors, among many others. This sort of problem – the 
analysis of the way that different vocabularies and methodologies, 
ostensibly concerned with the same subject, are related – has long been a 
central preoccupation of analytic philosophers ([1], ch.1). In such a 
complex, multifaceted field of inquiry, it seems very unlikely that all the 
many layers of explanation will prove amenable to any simple or 
straightforward, reductive analysis; nobody thinks that a comprehensive 
account of addiction will amount to “neurochemistry and stamp-col-
lecting”.1 If we are to unify the many different sciences of addiction 
while respecting their causal autonomy, then, what we are likely to need 
is an integrative framework.2 
In this paper, we propose a candidate for such a framework, which 
has been much discussed in recent years in the philosophy of mind and, 
increasingly, the philosophy of psychiatry. This is commonly known as 
“Externalist” or “4E” – for extended, embodied, embedded, and enactive 
– cognition, and focuses on the empirical and conceptual centrality of 
the wider extra-neural environment to cognitive and mental processes. 
We begin in Section 2 by outlining how such a perspective might apply 
to psychiatry more generally, before turning to some of the ways it can 
illuminate addiction in particular: Section 3 points to a way of dissolving 
the classic dichotomy between the “choice model” and “disease model” 
in the addiction literature; Section 4 shows how 4E concepts can clarify 
the interplay between the addict’s brain and her environment; and 
Section 5 considers how these insights help to explain the success of 
some recovery strategies, and may help to inform the development of 
new ones. We do not aim to provide novel findings here, nor to overturn 
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1 In a classic expression of reductionism, Sir Ernest Rutherford is reported to have quipped that “all science is physics or stamp-collecting”; either the investigation 
of fundamental phenomena, or the mere cataloguing and curating of the exotic local phenomena which resulted.  
2 De Haan [101] outlines a notably similar project, though differing in two important respects. The target of her integrative ambition is much broader (psychiatry 
as a whole), while her framework itself is narrower, involving just one of the four “E”s we employ, enactivism. “(A)n overarching framework,” as she explains, 
“provides orientation, treatment rationale, a shared language for communication with all those involved, and the means to explain treatment decisions to health 
insurers and to society at large” (p.3). 
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the claims advanced within the various sciences of addiction; rather, we 
wish to develop a common footing for those various disciplines, allowing 
them to communicate better amongst themselves on the basis of claims 
they already find uncontroversial. 
2. Externalist psychiatry 
Where do we have to look in order to understand a person’s mental 
health? A historically popular response is inside their head, in their 
brain. But following recent trends in the philosophical study of the mind, 
an increasingly large literature has suggested that the health and illness 
of the mind, too, may be more widely constituted (e.g., [2–15]). Take the 
case of schizophrenia. One sort of question we can ask is about the 
constitution of schizophrenia; what is the physical or material basis of 
such a condition? We might locate the answer to this question in the 
brain, but we might also look more widely — for example, to work 
suggesting that core self-disturbances in schizophrenia are (at least 
partially) constituted by disturbances of the individual’s embodied 
relationship with others and their material environment more generally 
[8,16]. A second sort of question about schizophrenia concerns status; in 
respect of what criteria is it the case that some individual does or does 
not suffer from schizophrenia? Again, an answer to this question might 
appeal only to neural properties, or it might appeal to a much broader 
set of social, ecological, or epidemiological considerations, for instance 
[17]. 
Thus, against the traditional biomedical model of mental health and 
illness [18]; c.f. [19–23] – which holds that psychiatric phenomena are 
determined by facts about the brain, and that we should therefore expect 
to explain mental illness exclusively in terms of neural activity – we 
propose an externalist model. This holds that a person’s mental health – 
order, or disorder – can depend upon facts about her social, material, 
and cultural environment, and not just upon facts about her brain. But 
this claim can mean a variety of different things; for instance, externalist 
answers to the status question will often look less radical than externalist 
answers to the constitution question. One thing, therefore, that we are 
concerned to do as externalists is to provide a “taxonomy” of different 
forms of externalism about mental disorder. 
For example, suppose that we say mental illness depends upon so-
ciety. One thing that could be meant by this is that mental illness tends 
to flourish in, or may even be caused to do so by, the social environment; 
thus, social conditions in schools or prisons might be depressogenic. 
Another thing we might mean is that mental illness is simply a “social 
construct”, lacking any real physical basis.3 This was the anti-realist 
view held by Thomas Szasz (e.g. [24], [25]), who held that illness 
required the presence of lesions, and so that “mental illness” was a myth 
used to discredit behaviour of which we disapproved, or which we found 
in various ways disgusting, inconvenient, or undesirable; brains could 
have lesions, and so illnesses, but minds could not. Thirdly, we might 
mean that whether somebody is mentally ill depends on her relation to 
other members of her population; possessing an anxiety disorder, for 
instance, might simply mean that she experiences anxiety significantly 
more frequently than other members of her community or other refer-
ence class (e.g. [26,27]). This would be an externalist answer to the 
status question that remains neutral on how best to answer the consti-
tution question. And fourthly, by analogy with the “institutional theory 
of art” (e.g. [28]), which holds that something is a work of art just in case 
a community of art experts says that it is, we might mean that whether a 
person has a mental illness or not is just a matter of whether she is 
judged by consensus among the psychiatric profession to do so. And this 
is just to scratch the surface of the possibilities. 
This externalist perspective builds from a more general philosophical 
view of the mind, sometimes referred to as “4E” cognition. This view 
regards the mind as being essentially embodied (meaning that a crea-
ture’s mental life is structured and governed by her physiological 
makeup as well as her neurological properties); embedded (mental states 
and processes unfold within a particular environmental niche, composed 
in part of an assortment of material and informational scaffolding, which 
supports and enhances cognitive powers); enacted (thinking beings 
inhabit a concerned perspective, so that through their interactions with 
their ecological surroundings they thereby create and discover meaning 
for themselves); and/or extended (the material underpinnings of an in-
dividual’s psychological states and processes are not confined to that 
individual’s head, or other biological boundaries, but can include re-
sources physically located in the wider environment). These four 
different features can come apart; each can be manifested independently 
of the others. And they differ in degrees of radicalism too, as we shall 
see. 
In short, on the externalist perspective, a person’s mental life is seen 
as shaped, structured, enriched, supported, and scaffolded by her body, 
and by the social, material, and cultural environment in which she is 
housed. We should not, therefore, expect to understand the mind and its 
disorders just by looking at the brain in isolation from the rest of the 
body, or from the complex social and material environment that we as 
humans build for ourselves. Our psychological life – our thinking, 
reasoning, remembering, emotions, experiences – is deeply embedded in 
the world around us, a world full of informational resources, tools, ar-
tefacts, computers, diaries, smart-phones, other people, social conven-
tions, rules, and so forth. In its strongest versions, this view suggests that 
mental states may not merely interact with, but be themselves composed 
by, such resources, and therefore be physically distributed across the 
brain, the body, and the outside world (e.g. [29]). 
Externalist psychiatry therefore asks how these 4E ways of thinking 
might inform our understanding of mental health and disorder.4 For 
instance, how – if at all – are symptoms of depression shaped and 
structured by one’s interactions with other people [30–32]? Is autistic 
spectrum disorder embodied and situated, or is it “purely neural” [13, 
33–35]? It also asks how the various approaches explored in this section, 
all of which promote in different ways - and to different degrees of 
radicalism - the idea that understanding mental health and illness re-
quires a focus that goes beyond the brain, fit together. In the following 
section we begin to explore how externalist psychiatry, in its many 
forms, might apply to, and inform, the integrated and multidisciplinary 
study of addiction. 
3. Beyond choice and disease 
At first glance, addiction seems to fit the 4E perspective extremely 
neatly. It is embodied insofar as the addict’s physiological properties (e.g. 
cravings felt within her body, and experienced as world-directed drives 
to use her body to alleviate bodily discomfort) structure and govern her 
mental life. It is embedded insofar as her mental activities both unfold 
within and depend upon her ecological niche; patterns of addiction, and 
of characteristic behaviour by addicts, are clearly influenced by the 
social and legal environment, for instance. It is enacted insofar as the 
addict’s mental activities occupy a concerned perspective that imbues 
her environment with subjective meaning; she experiences the envi-
ronment in particular ways, attributing to aspects of it a significance 
which others don’t, and lending particular buildings, shops, street 
3 Though see [102] for an argument against the idea that social construc-
tivism about any disease implies that it lacks a real physical substrate. 
4 Externalist psychiatry in this way challenges views according to which 
psychiatric disorders are a matter of one or more functional neurological fail-
ures. Some recent examples can be found in characterizations of depression 
[103–105] and anxiety [106] as brain disorders. Similarly, Insel and Quirion 
[107] begin their general defense of psychiatry as a clinical neuroscience 
discipline by insisting that “mental disorders be understood and treated as brain 
disorders” (p. 2221). And as we discuss below, many theorists regard addiction 
simple as a disease of the brain (e.g. [43]; [45]). 
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corners, or support communities a salience which is not “independently” 
or “objectively” there, but rather depends on and is constituted by her 
and other addicts’ needs and desires. And finally, it may also be extended 
where her psychological states are underpinned by resources physically 
external to her body. We will explore this point in more detail later, but 
such things as possessing legal vendors, a stash, or – in the notorious case 
of George Jones – a ride-on lawnmower one can use to reach a bar 
several miles away, may be important environmental constituents of the 
addict’s peace of mind, and may therefore be essential to other aspects of 
her cognitive functioning. Or, we might look to work on social media 
addiction, which acknowledges the increasingly-central role the Internet 
and online spaces play in scaffolding synchronic and diachronic features 
of our affective life [36]. In these cases, individuals are integrated with a 
rich array of ready-to-hand environmental resources, such as smart-
phones and social media spaces, that are designed specifically to 
maintain user attention and drive engagement; they may set up an 
ongoing feedback loop that persistently nudges users toward addictive 
practices and scaffold patterns of negative affect regulation (depression; 
rumination; low self-esteem, etc.) [37–39]. 
If anything, these observations may seem trivial: doesn’t everyone 
believe that a person’s mental life is supported and enriched by the 
environment in which they are housed? We want to make the case here 
that they are more than a mere collection of platitudes; after all, exter-
nalism is quite a radical and controversial position in the philosophy of 
psychiatry, and philosophy of mind. One way we might hope to do that 
would be to provide substantive new insights into addiction based on 4E 
thinking, though that is not what we will offer in this paper. Rather, and 
in keeping with the theme of the Special Issue, we will seek to show that 
it can provide an integrated theoretical framework, organising and 
explaining together a wide variety of existing perspectives and practices. 
One notable area in which externalism might perform this kind of 
integrative role is the classic dichotomy in the literature between the 
“Disease Model” and the “Choice Model” of addiction [40,41]. 
Caricaturing somewhat, we can say that theorists following the Disease 
Model tended to treat addiction as neurally-based, all-or-nothing (one is 
either an addict, or one is not), uncontrollable, progressive, and 
requiring treatment if it is not to result in eventual death (e.g. [42–46]); 
whereas adherents of the Choice Model viewed addiction as affecting, 
but not being reducible to, the brain chemistry, as coming in degrees, as 
often being attributable to social and environmental factors, but as 
fundamentally concerning decisions for which the addict is personally 
responsible (e.g. [3,47–50]). However, most theorists – including, it 
should be stressed, several of those cited as examples – now reject these 
rather simplistic caricatures. But the dichotomy between them still in-
fluences the framing of the literature, with the classic “Disease Model” 
and “Choice Model” presented as “extremes”, or poles, of the conceptual 
space. More sophisticated and nuanced positions are therefore depicted 
as occupying the “moderate” middle ground between them. The 4E 
perspective, however, can help us to move beyond the dichotomy by 
explaining what is wrong with posing the debate in these terms in the 
first place. 
Between the 4E perspective and the Choice Model, there appears to 
be a clear affinity; the Choice Model posits a range of social and envi-
ronmental factors which can influence both the initial etiology and the 
course, development, and prognosis of addiction. External factors thus 
seem to be centrally involved in the basic characteristic functioning of 
the addicted person, and the addicted mind. And there can scarcely be a 
more familiar observation in the empirical literature; from the classic 
“Rat Park” studies of Bruce Alexander onwards [51,52]; (cf. [53,54]), 
which showed that even cocaine-addicted rats would cease choosing to 
consume cocaine once more stimulating alternative activities - like play, 
socialising, or consuming saccharine - were provided, it has been clear 
that a key variable factor determining addiction rates has been the 
availability of alternatives in the environment. In a much-cited case, the 
Vietnam war saw extremely high rates of heroin use among G.I.s, the 
great majority of whom stopped without difficulty upon their discharge 
and return the USA.; of those who did not, comorbidity with PTSD and 
other psychiatric conditions was almost universal, with opiate use 
posited as a form of self-medication (e.g. [55,56]; [66]; [57]). 
The Disease Model is slightly trickier to reconcile with the 4E 
perspective, though the process of working out how to do so is 
instructive. What externalist approaches to psychiatry suggest is that 
social and environmental factors are standardly implicated in mental 
illness. Will Davies [3], for instance, points out that disorders like PTSD 
and reactive detachment disorder “constitutively require” external 
triggers – whatever the brain state is, a psychiatric case is not PTSD 
unless it takes place following trauma – while major depression requires 
disproportionate response to external stimulus, and other conditions such 
as oppositional defiant disorder, avoidant personality disorder, selective 
mutism, and factitious disorder are all inherently social in their pre-
sentation. So, a purely neural basis is not a necessary condition of psy-
chiatric disease. 
Tellingly, Davies also cites Neil Levy’s [58] paper, “Addiction is not a 
brain disease (and it matters)” in this regard; if you inhabit a world in 
which cocaine does not exist, Levy argues, then it doesn’t matter what 
neuropharmacological state you find yourself in there, you cannot be a 
cocaine addict. Nor are the rest of us, with dispositions to react in 
characteristically addictive ways to a nearly infinite variety of potential 
but non-existent toxins, thereby the sufferers of multiple addictions. The 
key insight here is in Levy’s title, though we can’t say if it was his 
intention; addiction is not a brain disease, but it does not follow that it is 
not a disease at all. Very little, on an externalist view of psychiatry, is just 
a brain disease; psychiatric illness is not confined to the inside of the 
skull. 
So, the 4E theorist will here propose a better version of the Disease 
Model, a “Disease Model 2.0′′. Of course, the correct definition of “dis-
ease” is widely disputed among philosophers, and the debates over ad-
diction’s disease-status have only rarely engaged with this literature 
([59], p. 44). But our suggestions here align with several recent moves in 
that literature, and so can be motivated independently of their utility in 
moving this particular debate forward (even if we cannot provide a 
full-dress defense of those moves at this point). 
On this improved model, the neural basis of addiction is first of all 
replaced with a view of addiction as simultaneously neurally-and- 
externally constituted. This follows not only Davies’ claims as already 
summarised (cf. also [2,7,14,15]), but also Glackin’s [6] arguments that 
many somatic or bodily diseases, too, are externally constituted in the 
same or analogous ways; the concept of “disease” generally - and not 
only psychiatric disease - therefore includes social and environmental 
factors not merely as causes, but frequently as necessary constituents of 
the condition. And other theorists have advanced self-consciously “ho-
listic” views of health and illness (e.g. [60–63]),5 which have never-
theless sought to incorporate the main insights of the classic 
“biomedical” accounts associated with Boorse [26,27] and Wakefield 
[64,65]. In short, as far as the current literature on disease goes, those 
who view addiction as a disease should not on that ground object to this 
modification. 
With this feature of the Disease Model amended, though, we can see 
grounds for similarly relaxing or qualifying most of the other stances 
which divide its adherents from those of the Choice Model. With perhaps 
5 In fact, in modern discussion the point goes back at least to John Dewey, 
who told the College of Physicians at St. Louis that “(w)e must observe and 
understand internal processes and their interactions from the standpoint of 
their interactions with what is going on outside the skin” ([108], p. 326); [109], 
p. 27) invokes this speech in support of de Haan’s proposed [101] enactivist 
psychiatry. 
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the exception of Thomas Szasz (e.g. [24,25]), very few philosophers of 
disease have viewed it as possessing determinate, all-or-nothing 
criteria.6 So again, viewing addiction as a disease does not entail 
treating it as a binary condition, that one either has or does not have, 
with no liminal or intermediate cases. Moreover, once we admit envi-
ronmental factors as partial constituents of addiction, we can expect the 
status of addiction likewise to vary along with the strength and preva-
lence of those external factors. 
Much of the attraction of the classical Disease Model lies in its 
rhetorical force in destigmatising addiction; it replaced a standard view 
of addiction as a form of moral failure ([10], p. 1552) and emphasised 
the degree to which addicts lacked control over their actions. While that 
emphasis always had a strong element of rhetorical overstatement - 
addicts are clearly in more control of their condition than e.g. cancer 
patients, while much recent research shows that the majority of addicts 
“mature out” of their conditions eventually, without intervention [66] - 
an externalist modification of the model provides a more realistic view, 
while allowing us to acknowledge that the degree to which addiction is 
controllable is at least substantially dependent on the affordances of the 
environment, and the scope it allows for the making of choices. And 
rather than seeing addiction as inherently progressive, tending inexo-
rably towards mortality if untreated, we can see that treatment often just 
is adjustment of the constitutive environment, which the addict may or 
may not deliberately seek; in many cases, treatment of extra-neural 
factors such as the body of the addict, their social life, their home life, 
their environment etc. will be as important and effective as intervening 
directly upon deregulated neuromodulatory mechanisms. So, with the 
Disease Model suitably adjusted in light of 4E insights about the nature 
of disease, the conflict with the Choice Model largely dissolves; it is now 
apparent that the dichotomy between them was a false one all along. The 
two do not define outer limits of a continuum, between which all other 
views must be located; each point of difference between them has, in 
truth, been illusory. 
Of course, there is only so much that can be gleaned from discussing 
caricatures; it will be helpful to consider how this shift in perspective 
might apply to a real-life dispute from the literature. Consider an 
important recent exchange between Gabriel Segal and Nick Heather. 
Segal [44] defends the claim that alcoholism is a disease, albeit in a 
heterodox way. As Heather ([111], p. 321) writes, “(h)e strips away 
from the disease concept almost all the features that have previously 
been seen as essential to it,” including the requirements “that problem 
drinking is chronic, irreversible, or progressive”, that alcoholics are 
“physically dependent on alcohol”, that they cannot “recover without 
treatment or a recovery program,” and that they are not “morally 
responsible for their drinking and its consequences”. In short, Segal’s 
account of “disease” is right in line with the “Disease Model 2.0” sug-
gested above, save that “in Segal’s account… alcoholism is all-or-none; 
although among those having the disease it comes in degrees, you either 
have alcoholism or you do not” ([111], p. 322). 
“Most surprisingly,” for Heather ([111], p. 321.), and again in line 
with the revised model, Segal characterises alcoholism as “a psycho-
logical disease” rather than a brain disease ([44], p. 301− 2). Heather’s 
surprise is due to Segal’s support for the incentive sensitization theory of 
addiction although, as we argue in the next section, this too fits neatly 
into the externalist perspective. Heather himself, while a prominent 
critic of the disease view, is no straightforward supporter of the Choice 
Model, and is known for his emphasis on the compulsive aspect of 
addiction (e.g. [67,68]). His opposition to the “disease” label is in the 
end pragmatic, for while he grants that “calling a category of behavior a 
disease is essentially arbitrary; however, it has important consequences” 
([111], p. 323). In particular, he argues, the rhetoric and assumptions 
that accompany viewing addiction as a disease obscure the importance 
of viewing it as a public health issue; he quotes psychiatrist Robert 
Kendell [69] to the effect that “alcohol-related harm is more a political 
than a medical problem” ([111], p. 323). 
But for an externalist, there is no tension here. Disease, dysfunction, 
and illness, properly understood, are often crucially and constitutively 
dependent on the arrangement of the material, social, and politico-legal 
environment, among numerous other external institutions and resources 
that may be encompassed by and implicated in our healthy or patho-
logical cognitive processes. It is just for this reason that the “disease, but 
not brain disease” distinction made by Segal is important. 
Indeed, the distance between the two collapses further when we 
consider the exchange between Heather and Ole-Jørgen Skog, to which 
Heather alludes in his contribution to this volume. Responding to 
Heather’s definition of addiction in terms of “repeated failures to refrain 
from drug use despite prior resolutions to do so” ([70], p. 3), Skog ob-
jects that we should still regard as an addict somebody who has never 
actually tried to give up drug use, but would counterfactually suffer 
repeated failures were they to do so; actual failure may be an important 
diagnostic criterion, but the user – “the same person in two different 
contexts” – is in the same neurological state either way ([71], p. 160). 
Heather’s response is on the one hand epistemic – Skog’s view would 
mean that until repeated failure manifests, we are not in a position to say 
whether someone is addicted or not – and on the other metaphysical; 
Skog, he argues, confuses the neuro-adaptation both users possess in 
common with the behavioural phenomenon of addiction, which consists 
in the interaction of that neuro-adapted brain-state with a suitable 
environmental setting ([72], p. 177). Music to an externalist’s ears! 
4. The world of the addict 
A central concept in the literature on enactive and embodied 
cognition is that of affordance. Though the concept borrows heavily from 
the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (esp. [73]), contemporary use of the 
term originates with the work of J.J. Gibson, who defined the affor-
dances of a given environment, for a given animal, as “what it offers the 
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill… (the term) 
implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment” [74]. 
The features of the environment – objects, arrangements, processes – 
“suggest” to the concerned observer how they may be acted upon or 
interacted with. In this way, we as agents experience the environment as 
“facilitating”, even encouraging or inviting [75], our action. It seems to 
us to be suffused with potential, relative to our priorities. 
Externalist psychiatry points to breakdown or disruption in the en-
vironment’s affordances as the grounds of at least some mental illness; 
the disorder may consist in the environment failing to make itself 
available to the patient in important ways. Depression seems to involve a 
general loss of affordance; the world ceases to seem to “offer itself” to be 
acted in and upon according to our priorities and values. Those values 
thus in a sense lose their valency; they no longer perceptually solicit the 
depressed person’s engagement, and she can no longer motivate herself 
to act on them. The world strikes her as “flat” and “colourless”, no longer 
welcoming or hospitable to her as an agent [9]. 
Similarly, we have elsewhere argued that Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
may in large part be constituted by an inability to experience the normal 
affordances of the human social world; patients are unable to discern, to 
access, and to act in accordance with the “mental institutions” which 
structure neurotypical social interaction [13,34]. In a famous image, H. 
L.A. Hart poses Wittgenstein’s classic “rule-following” problem in terms 
of a father instructing his child about proper behaviour upon entering a 
church ([76], ch. 7; [77], §§ 185–243; [78]); he takes off his hat and says 
“this is what you are supposed to do”. It’s not specified to the child 
whether or not he must use one hand rather than the other to do so, 
whether he must do so on all days of the week, or just on Sundays, or just 
before midday, that hats and caps, but not e.g. wigs are to be included… 
6 Even Boorse, perhaps the only major figure who still eschews any role for 
evaluative criteria in defining disease, views it as sufficiently large deviation 
from a “statistically normal range of function”, where that range is to be con-
textually defined. 
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but the child can work all of this out, effortlessly, by access to the mental 
institutions which determine, and indicate, and are constituted by what 
people typically care about in this sort of scenario. This is a form of “vehicle 
externalism”, meaning that the mental processes we are concerned with 
are realised in part by a resource external to the brain, but the external 
vehicle in question is not just a concrete artefact; it’s a set of conven-
tions, practices, mutual understandings, and so forth. 
Now, does addiction look like a disruption of affordances in this 
fashion? Here’s the testimony of a recovering addict, the philosopher 
Peg O’Connor: 
In many ways, I think active alcoholics have a form of life different from 
that of recovered alcoholics, as well as from that of non-alcoholics. The 
world we all share is the same in important respects. But in some deep 
ways, the lived world and its meanings are radically different. Consider 
some differences between people with long-term sobriety and those who 
are actively alcoholic, or even newly entering a recovery program. An 
unrecovered alcoholic often can’t even understand the alcoholic who 
says, “Your life will be better without alcohol. You will like yourself more. 
You will have more friends and a lot more fun.” To the unrecovered, 
people in recovery can seem preachy and sanctimonious. Early on, no 
matter how many times and in how many ways a long-timer says this, 
what the unrecovered person hears is more like, “Blah, blah, serenity. 
Blah, blah, blah, serenity,” as a great Gary Larson cartoon reminds us. 
Non-alcoholics can’t fathom alcoholics, those of us who would risk our 
livelihoods, families, and whatever else we hold near and dear in order to 
drink. We can offer huge chains of reasoning that make sense to us, and to 
other alcoholics. But to non-alcoholics, unless they’ve been enlisted in 
enabling us, we can seem to be beyond logic and sanity. [79] 
It is instructive to consider this passage in light of the seminal theory 
of addiction as incentive-sensitization or incentive-salience (e.g. [40, 
80–84]). This holds that, by enhancing mesotelencephalic dopamine 
neurotransmission, addictive drugs effectively hijack that neural sys-
tem’s characteristic psychological function of incentivising the brain to 
seek reward-associated stimuli. The drugs’ effect is to hypersensitize the 
dopamine reward system to such drugs and thereby to trigger patho-
logical incentive motivation (“craving”), which persists even after long 
periods of abstinence.7 
In lay terms: drugs affect the mechanisms that make our appetites 
responsive to particular triggers, so that our appetites for drugs become 
completely disproportionate to the amount of pleasure actually gained 
from them. Drugs thereby come to be wanted by the addict, far more than 
they are actually liked; their “salience” as incentives to action is radically 
amplified. In this way, the experience of drug-taking not only alters the 
brain chemistry, but via the brain chemistry it profoundly changes the 
drug-taker’s motivational space, the agential structure of her 
environment. 
To undergo this process, in other words, is literally to have one’s 
world changed; the world itself does not change, but the addict’s world – 
the world of their lived experience, or Lebenswelt [85] – is radically 
altered. Indeed, the process represents an epistemically transformative 
experience [86,87]; the lived worlds of the addict and the sober person, 
with their characteristic motivations and affordances, become as 
O’Connor describes ([79]; O’Connor cites [77] §19, §23, §241), mutually 
incomprehensible, and mutually epistemically inaccessible. 
The externalist perspective thus allows us to integrate the leading 
neurochemical account of addiction with typical first-hand accounts of 
the phenomenology, or lived experience, of the addict. And further 
support is lent to this integration by similar work applying the incentive- 
sensitization theory to Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder [88,89]. OCD, 
which presents a remarkably similar phenomenological cocktail of 
compulsion, freewill, and responsibility, is equally naturally understood 
as being constituted by a derangement of environmental affordances; 
that it seems to result from a similar derangement of the feedback 
relation between the environment and the brain’s reward system can 
scarcely be an accident. 
5. Recovery and cognitive scaffolding 
Closely related to the idea of environmental affordances is that of 
cognitive scaffolding. That is, our cognitive activity is frequently scaf-
folded by external resources; we arrange our environment to facilitate 
our mental processes, by replacing the cognitive tasks and challenges 
that typically face us with more tractable ones. This is a key part of the 
view of cognition as being embedded in, and extended over, the material 
and informational environment, and its powers as being supported and 
enhanced by the suitable configuration of that environment. 
Sometimes these are homely and familiar; one of us, as an inveterate 
forgetter-of-packed-lunches, finds that leaving his rucksack beside the 
refrigerator overnight makes him much more likely to remember to 
retrieve the sandwiches he has left there, before departing for work in 
the morning. But the literature on embedded and extended cognition 
envisions much more radical and ambitious instances. In a landmark 
text in cognitive science, for instance, Lakoff and Johnson [90] argued 
that patterns of human cognition and behaviour were strongly depen-
dent on a deep and ubiquitous set of associations scaffolded in the main 
by familiar linguistic metaphors. Edwin Hutchins [91] has demonstrated 
that cognitive processes take place not merely at the level of individual 
human brains, but across systems – Naval ships, for instance – composed 
often of numerous human agents, and a great deal of artefactual appa-
ratus. Perhaps most radically, Andy Clark and David Chalmers [29] have 
argued that external objects can function as part of the mind if they 
perform the same role in supporting cognitive processes as might 
otherwise be performed by parts of the brain. In a famous 
thought-experiment, they consider Otto and Inga, both of whom are 
simultaneously travelling to a museum; while Inga navigates her way 
there from memory, Otto – who has Alzheimer’s disease – relies on 
written directions in a notebook. Since the only difference between the 
two cases is that the process of navigation takes place wholly inside the 
brain in Inga’s case and partly outside it in Otto’s, they argue, it is only 
arbitrarily and dogmatically that we can insist on confining “cognition” 
to what occurs within the confines of the skull. For the psychiatric 
externalist, cognitive and other mental disorders can therefore be 
constituted by disturbances to, or absences of, such external resources. 
This insight, we suggest, helps to understand much of what is 
observed in recovery from addiction, and the many strategies and re-
sources that are employed to support it. In some cases, these may be 
quite simple tokens – consider the chips and key fobs given to Alcoholics 
Anonymous members to mark and celebrate milestones in sobriety, 
which are often invaluable in helping addicts to steel their resolve to 
persevere – while in others they may be very complicated, multifaceted 
strategies. But in either case they are easily, and illuminatingly, 
construed as “scaffolds”; (re)arrangements of the material and infor-
mational environment which alter the cognitive tasks and challenges it 
presents us with. Indeed, one way that they may do so is by altering the 
environment’s emotional valence and significance [92]; by creating new 
affordances or strengthening existing ones. That is, since our affective 
processes may admit of externalist analysis just as much as our cognitive 
ones, affective scaffolding may be just as important as cognitive scaf-
folding in supporting recovery. 
A recent line of philosophical analysis of addiction, developed by 
Chandra Sripada [93], explains just why this sort of scaffolding may be 
7 Since the incentive-salience theory is often seen as a key plank of the brain- 
disease view of addiction, and is fundamentally concerned with neural pro-
cesses, a reader might worry that it does not sit particularly easily with the 4E 
perspective we advance here. We think this is unproblematic, as we emphasise 
the complementary nature of e.g. the affordance literature and the neurological 
literature in the example given above. But for more detailed views of how 
incentive-salience can be seen as part of an inherently embodied learning 
process, see [10,12]. 
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so significant. Humans, he observes, are fundamentally fallible; this has 
been a theme in philosophical writing on the human condition going 
back at least to St. Augustine [94]. Even when we are extremely good – 
world-class – at tasks, we will fail at them; Steph Curry, the most ac-
curate free throw-taker in professional basketball history, misses about 
one such shot in every ten. The resisting of one’s cravings is a highly 
complex, difficult, cognitive task; one requiring near-constant vigilance 
in the face of countless temptations and reminders. The IRA are reported 
to have told UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher, following a failed 
assassination attempt, that “we only need to be lucky once; you need to 
be lucky every time”. If even Homer nods, we can scarcely wonder that 
so many addicts do eventually relapse, given the sheer number of 
separate occasions on which they must succeed in resisting their crav-
ings, minute by minute, hour by hour, day by day, if they are to remain 
sober. 
So a huge amount of what goes into successful recovery from 
addiction, and what is involved in effective therapeutic intervention, 
seems to consist of strategies and resources to simplify the task of 
resisting cravings; to make it more tractable; to guard against such 
failures, and to manage the consequences when they begin to happen. 
Recovering addicts invariably display “self-binding” practices [95], on 
the model of Odysseus binding himself to the ship’s mast in order to 
resist the sirens’ song: finding new social circles, and routes to and from 
work unassociated with their prior drug use; sending paycheques to 
spouses’ accounts to prevent themselves from gambling; wearing 
long-sleeved shirts to avoid constantly seeing inviting and available 
veins; removing cigarette-lighters from their cars ([96], p. 21).8 More-
over, as Hanna Pickard [97] observes, addiction often conveys a sense of 
self and self-worth. In other words, it need not exclusively be experi-
enced as a diminishment or loss of self (i.e., destruction of an individual’s 
life due to addictive cravings or impulses) but rather as an identity gain 
[98]: a pathway to meaningful practices, relationships (e.g., with fellow 
addicts), social roles, and other forms of group identification that 
enduringly scaffold an individual’s identity and sense of purpose. 
Accordingly, recovery may, among other things, involve cultivating 
environments and networks of relationships that scaffold the develop-
ment and maintenance of post-addiction sources of social reward and 
relationships, self-esteem, and social identity. As one addict in recovery 
says, a non-addict sense of self does not suddenly emerge once the 
addiction is overcome; it must be actively imagined and created: “[Y] 
ou’ve got to work at becoming someone and something else” (quoted in 
[97], p.15). Supportive material and social niches furnish scaffolding 
essential for this post-addiction identity-work. 
These insights may - and indeed, already do - help us to design better 
programmes of therapy, by focussing on identifying, isolating, and 
altering the cognitive tasks the addict must perform in order to maintain 
sobriety, with a view to maximising her chances of successfully repeated 
performance. By constructing a material and social niche that is free 
from salient reminders of addiction, for example - an environment that 
resists the formation of bad habits and poor choices, by making it more 
difficult for the addict to encounter the people and places that are most 
likely to prompt addictive behaviour and scaffold her social identity as 
an addict – the agent can improve these chances: not by altering her 
brain chemistry or otherwise resolving the internal determinants of her 
condition, but by transforming her experienced relation to the world 
around her and manipulating the nudges, encouragements, and de-
terrences the people and things in this world afford. More positively, 
too, recognising addiction as a dysregulation of the wider agent- 
environment dynamics may allow us to identify new aspects of that 
dynamic to address. For instance, if an overly narrow field of reward 
possibilities fuels progressively extreme sampling of a few rewards 
([99], p. 115ff.), then working to create an environment with wider 
reward possibilities (new hobbies, serving the community, new friends, 
etc.) could be especially beneficial to staving off addiction.9 
6. Conclusion 
We began by observing the unusually complex, many-layered char-
acter of the psychiatric phenomenon of addiction, salient facets of which 
appear to arise at different levels of explanation: the level of brain 
structures and their chemistry; the level of individual persons and their 
choices; the level of legal, social, and political institutions; and so forth. 
We have offered some preliminary foundations for an integrative theo-
retical framework whose aim is to capture several of these levels in a 
conceptually coherent way, and to shed new light on addiction by 
reformulating some entrenched disputes from extant literature on the 
topic. The Externalist or 4E framework encourages us to recognise that a 
person’s mental health or disorder, like all of her other psychological 
attributes, depends heavily upon how she is situated within a richly- 
scaffolded material and interpersonal environment. Facts that concern 
what goes on outside a person’s head help to determine her status as 
mentally healthy or ill, and may even partially constitute the material 
underpinnings of her psychiatric condition. 
In the case of addiction, we have argued, the externalist perspective 
can help to dissolve the conflict between the models of Choice and 
Disease, by reconceiving disease as something that is realised only when 
a wide profile of neural, bodily, and external-environmental conditions 
is met. By building the social, the cultural, and the material into our 
picture of disease - and widening our focus beyond the brain - the gap 
between addiction-as-disease and addiction-as-choice is reduced, 
perhaps to the point of elimination. Secondly, the externalist’s emphasis 
of the cognitive agent’s powers to make meaning for herself by manip-
ulating significant parts of the surrounding environment - and thereby 
manipulating the dynamic interaction of brain chemistry, interoception, 
and material and informational environment - enables us to reconsider 
the symptoms of addiction, and the addict’s strategies for recovery. 
Addictive behaviours do not occur in a vacuum: they are drawn out of 
the agent in particular contexts; perceptually invited in some scenarios 
and disinvited in others. The familiar terrain in which a person’s 
addiction has become established and habituated is likely to afford few 
salient obstacles to, say, continued drug or alcohol abuse. By attending 
to and altering her surroundings, however - for instance through the use 
of physical tokens of success; through interaction with sources of 
emotional support; or by mapping goals and milestones in a tangible 
format - it is possible for the addict to let the outside world take on some 
of the psychological labour of recovery. 
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